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Abstract 
Episodic counterfactual thoughts (CFT) and autobiographical memories (AM) 
involve the reactivation and recombination of episodic memory components into mental 
simulations. Upon reactivation, memories become labile and prone to modification. Thus, 
reactivating AM in the context of mentally generating CFT may provide an opportunity for 
editing processes to modify the content of the original memory. To examine this idea, this 
paper reports the results of two studies that investigated the effect of reactivating negative 
and positive AM in the context of either imagining a better (i.e., upward CFT) or a worse 
(i.e., downward CFT) alternative to an experienced event, as opposed to attentively 
retrieving the memory without mental modification (i.e., remembering) or no reactivation. 
Our results suggest that attentive remembering was the best strategy to both reduce the 
negative affect associated with negative AM, and to prevent the decay of positive affect 
associated with positive AM. In addition, reactivating positive, but not negative, AM with 
or without CFT modification reduces the perceived arousal of the original memory over 
time. Finally, reactivating negative AM in a downward CFT or an attentive remembering 
condition increases the perceived detail of the original memory over time. 
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Introduction 
Remembering specific autobiographical memories (AM) involves the reactivation 
and active reconstruction of episodic information into coherent mental simulations 
(Schacter & Addis, 2007). Usually, when we remember AM, we generate a mental 
simulation whose content more or less matches the way in which we originally experienced 
the event. However, given the dynamic nature of memory reconstruction, it is possible to 
mentally modify aspects of AM, both voluntarily and involuntarily, when mentally 
simulating them at retrieval. For instance, while most of the time we simulate AM from 
the same first-person perspective from which we originally experienced the remembered 
event, sometimes we mentally shift to an observer or third-person perspective when 
remembering certain AM, seeing ourselves in the memory rather than viewing it from our 
own eyes (Nigro & Neisser, 1983). The flexibility of these perspective shifts not only 
speaks to the dynamic nature of the memory retrieval (Schacter, 1996) but it also offers 
researchers strategies to experimentally manipulate the content and phenomenology of the 
retrieved AM in order to explore how AM may be modified (Butler, et al., 2011; St Jacques, 
Szpunar & Schacter, 2017). 
Besides perspective shifts, another important way in which we mentally modify 
AM is when we imagine alternative ways in which the remembered events might have 
occurred instead—a common psychological experience known as episodic counterfactual 
thinking (CFT; De Brigard & Giovanello, 2012; Roese & Epstude, 2017). Extant evidence 
suggests that episodic CFT depends upon similar cognitive and neural mechanisms as those 
involved in the construction of episodic memories (De Brigard, Addis, et al., 2013) and 
future thoughts (Van Hoeck et al., 2013). To account for these similarities, it has been 
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suggested that, akin to the process of mentally simulating AM and future thoughts, 
mentally simulating episodic counterfactual thoughts also requires the reactivation and 
recombination of autobiographical episodic information (Schacter, Benoit, De Brigard & 
Szpunar, 2015). 
 Importantly, evidence from numerous studies in CFT indicates that retrieving AM 
in the context of generating episodic CFT has affective consequences. According to 
Kahneman and Miller’s (1986) influential proposal, counterfactual thoughts serve an 
emotional amplification role by heightening the emotions associated with the imagined 
alternative event. More precisely, if a certain outcome is mentally contrasted with an 
imagined better alternative in which a more desirable outcome could have occurred instead, 
the negative emotion associated with not having achieved that imagined outcome is 
heightened. As such, these upward counterfactuals—i.e., CFT in which the imagined 
alternative event is better than the actual one—tend to heighten negative emotions such as 
regret and disappointment. Conversely, if a certain outcome is mentally contrasted with an 
imagined worse alternative in which a less desirable outcome could have occurred instead, 
the positive emotion associated with having actually achieved a more desirable outcome 
than the imagined one is heightened. Thus, these downward counterfactuals—i.e., CFT in 
which the imagined alternative event is worse than the actual one—tend to heighten 
positive emotions, such as relief and content.  
Subsequent results have supported this view for episodic CFT that are based on 
AM. Evidence that upward episodic CFT evokes negative emotions has been reported 
numerous times. In a pioneering study, Roese (1994) asked participants to remember 
unpleasant AM. He then asked them to imagine either better (upward CFT) or worse 
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(downward CFT) alternatives to the actual experienced event. Participants induced to 
generate upward episodic counterfactual thoughts reported higher negative affect and 
greater feelings of regret relative to participants induced to generate downward episodic 
CFT (see also Gilovich and Medvec, 1995; Landman, 1993; Roese 1997; 1999; Allen, 
Greenless, & Jones; 2014; Stanley, Parikh, et al., 2017). Complementary results have 
shown that generating downward episodic CFT about specific AM tend to evoke positive 
emotions. For example, McMullen and Markman (2000) showed that when participants are 
asked to imagine how a bad experience could have become more tragic, people experience 
more positive emotions about the actual outcome as compared to those who did not retrieve 
the autobiographical memory in the context of a downward episodic CFT (Rim & 
Summerville, 2014; White & Lehman, 2005). 
Nevertheless, given that most research on affective consequences of episodic CFT 
has focused on immediate effects that follow from the simulation of a counterfactual 
thought, it is unclear whether there may be long-term effects on AM when they are 
retrieved in the context of episodic CFT (for initial relevant evidence, see De Brigard, 
Szpunar & Schacter, 2013; Gerlach, Dornblaser & Schacter, 2014). Following recent 
evidence documenting reactivation-related modifications in AM (e.g., Hupbach et al, 2007; 
Schwabe & Wolf, 2009; Finn & Roediger, 2011; Forcato et al, 2011; St Jacques & 
Schacter, 2013; St Jacques, Montgomery & Schacter, 2015), the current three-session study 
investigates whether retrieving both positive and negative AM in the context of either 
upward or downward episodic CFT modifies their phenomenological characteristics 
relative to reactivating them but without counterfactual modification, or not reactivating 
them at all. In session 1, participants provided positive and negative episodic AM, which 
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they rated along five dimensions: valence, arousal, detail, ease and reliving. A week later, 
in session 2, participants were asked to reactivate a subset of their reported positive and 
negative memories, and to do so in the context of generating upward counterfactual 
simulations, downward counterfactual simulations, or simply to attentively reactivate them 
without counterfactual modification. Finally, a day after the reactivation manipulation, 
participants returned for a third and final session in which all AM were presented again 
(including baseline AM not reactivated during session 2), while being asked to rate them 
along the same dimensions used in the first session. 
The current study allows us to explore whether reactivating emotional memories in 
the context of either an upward or a downward counterfactual simulation differentially 
modifies their phenomenological characteristics relative to attentively reactivating the 
memories in non-imaginative contexts, or not reactivating them at all. Specifically, we 
explore possible reactivation-related changes in five phenomenological dimensions—
valence, arousal, detail, ease and reliving—based upon two lines of evidence. On the one 
hand, several studies on both episodic future and CFT show reactivation-related effects on 
valence, arousal, and detail—although these effects are measured on the CFT per se, not 
the AM they are derived from (Szpunar and Schacter, 2013; De Brigard, Szpunar, & 
Schacter, 2013; Stanley, Stewart, & De Brigard, 2017; Stanley, Parikh, et al., 2017). On 
the other hand, recent studies have shown effects on intensity (Sekiguchi & Nonaka, 2014), 
reliving (St Jacques, Szpunar and Schacter, 2017) and vividness (Akhtar, Justice, Loveday 
and Conway, 2017) in AM after perspective-shifts during reactivation. Within this context, 
the current study explores five specific hypotheses. First, given similarities between CFT 
and perspective-shift in AM (St Jacques, Carpenter, Szpunar and Schacter, 2018) as well 
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as reactivation-related effects of perspective-shifts in AM (e.g., Sekiguchi and Nonaka, 
2014; Butler et al., 2016; St Jacques et al., 2017), we expected changes from the first to the 
last session for valence, arousal and detail in AM reactivated in the CFT conditions relative 
to those reactivated in the attentive remembering and baseline conditions. Second, based 
upon previous results showing increases in ease and reliving as a function of repetition for 
both CFT and AM (De Brigard et al., 2013; Stanley et al., 2017), we expected ease and 
reliving to equally increase after reactivation for the attentive remembering and CFT 
conditions relative to baseline. 
Third, consistent with the emotional amplification view of CFT, we also 
hypothesize that the direction of this effect would differ between negative and positive 
memories depending on whether the original memory is reactivated in the context of an 
upward or a downward CFT. For instance, we predict that if episodic CFT affects the 
original AM in the direction of the simulation, then negative AM would be reappraised as 
less negative if they have been reactivated in downward CFT (which are usually associated 
with feeling of relief), whereas positive AM would be reappraised as less positive if they 
have been reactivated in upward CFT (which are usually associated with feeling of regret). 
Fourth, we anticipate lasting down-regulation of both negative and positive AM in the 
attentive reactivation condition without counterfactual modification, thus providing a 
reappraisal baseline against which to compare the effects of the episodic CFT 
manipulation. We base this hypothesis on recent research concerning affect-biased 
attention and emotional reappraisal of AM, according to which selectively attending to 
salient aspects of emotional experiences tends to modulate our affective responses toward 
them relative to not attending to such features, or selectively attending to irrelevant aspects 
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of emotional experiences (Ochsner & Gross, 2005; Todd et al., 2012). Finally, we expect 
minimal to no changes between the first and third sessions in the AM that are not 
reactivated in session 2, thus providing an appropriate baseline of potential changes in AM 
due to time alone against which to compare effects of reactivation. 
 
Experiment 1 
Methods 
Participants. 26 community members from the Durham, NC area, and 5 from the 
Boston area, participated in the study. Data from 6 participants were excluded because of 
failure to understand the instructions (4 participants) or computer error (2 participants). As 
such, data from 25 participants were analyzed (M age = 21.36, SD = 2.94; 17 women). For 
sample size estimation, a power analysis using G*Power 3.1 was conducted based on a 
previous between-subjects study (Sekiguchi & Nonaka, 2014) that reported a large effect 
size of session (η2 = .39) on emotional intensity. Assuming an alpha level of .05 and a 
suggested power = .80, the projected sample size needed for the current study was N = 22, 
making our sample size adequate to detect an effect of at least partial η2 = .39. Participants 
received monetary compensation for their collaboration, and gave consent following the 
requirements of the Institutional Review Boards at Harvard and Duke Universities. 
Procedure. The study consisted of three sessions. In session 1, participants 
generated 42 negative and 42 positive autobiographical memories about specific decisions 
made in the past 5 years (e.g., “deciding to express a political view in public”; “deciding 
to skip a meeting”). To help retrieve these memories, participants were provided with a list 
of 100 possible common decisions. This list was previously normed with a large sample 
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from the same population as the participants, and it has been previously employed in other 
studies (e.g., De Brigard, Spreng, Mitchell, & Schacter, 2015; De Brigard, Parikh, et al., 
2017). For each memory, participants typed a short description of the event and a title. 
Additionally, participants rated each memory on Valence (1 = negative, 9 = positive), 
Arousal (1 = calm, 9 = excited), Detail (1 = vague, 9 = clear), Ease (1 = difficult, 9 = easy), 
and Reliving (1 = low, 9 = high).  
Approximately one week later (between 6 and 9 days), participants returned to the 
lab for session 2. Participants were asked to engage in counterfactual simulation or to 
remember the memories they had generated in the previous session, as indicated by screen 
headings. There were two CFT conditions: Upward and Downward. In the upward 
condition, participants saw the header “Better”, were asked to imagine an 
alternative better way in which a memory—cued by the title provided in session 1—could 
have occurred, and to type a brief summary of that counterfactual simulation. For example, 
suppose that a participant reported a negative memory about skipping a meeting that turned 
out to be important. When cued to imagine a better alternative for this memory, the 
participant would describe an alternative, better way in which the event could have 
occurred, e.g., having the meeting postponed at the last minute. In the downward condition, 
participants saw the header “Worse” and were asked to imagine, and type, an 
alternative worse way in which the cued memory could have occurred. For example, 
suppose that a participant reported the positive memory of being asked an easy question in 
a final exam. In the downward condition, the participant would imagine and describe an 
alternative, worse way in which the event could have happened, i.e., being asked a very 
difficult question. In the Remember condition, participants saw the heading “Remember”, 
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were asked to retrieve the event exactly as it happened, and were asked to attend and record 
a specific yet salient detail of the memory. For example, if a person reported having closely 
missed the subway, they were asked to focus on a salient detail of the subway station (e.g., 
the smell or a poster on the wall). The task was self-paced and there were no time limits. 
Participants simulated 10 better and 10 worse counterfactuals for positive and negative 
AMs, and 10 positive and 10 negative memories were reactivated; additionally, 10 positive 
and 10 negative remembered events were not cued during the second session. All memories 
were randomly selected in equal numbers from positive and negative memories (i.e., 40 
from the set of negative, and 40 from the set of positive AM), and the title-cues were 
presented randomly as well. The remaining four memories were used for an initial, practice 
trial.  
Session 3 took place one day later.  Participants were presented with the titles of all 
80 memories generated in session 1, and were asked to determine if each memory had been 
associated with a counterfactual alternative on the previous day (i.e., presented under 
“Better” or “Worse” headings) or not (i.e., presented under “Remember” heading or not at 
all).  They were then asked to rate their confidence in their recognition response on a 9-
point scale (1 = low, 9 = high). Finally, participants rated each memory on the same 
dimensions they had encountered in the first session: Valence, Arousal, Detail, Ease and 
Reliving. As in session 1, scales also ranged from 1 to 9, and were identically anchored. 
 
Results  
Average ratings and standard deviations for all trials are displayed in Table 1. Data 
from positive and negative memories were modeled independently as five separate 4 
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(Condition: Upward, Downward, Remember, Baseline) by 2 (Session: First, Last) 
ANOVAs for each rating. Post-hoc tests were Bonferroni corrected. 
Valence. For negative memories, there was a main effect of Session, F(1, 24) = 
49.07, p < .001, partial η2 = .67, indicating that valence ratings increased (i.e., became 
more positive) from the first (M = 2.46, SEM = .10) to the last session (M = 3.27, SEM = 
.12) in all conditions. There was also a main effect of Condition, F(3, 22) = 4.92, p = .004, 
partial η2 = .17, but no interaction (p = .28). Post-hoc tests indicated overall lower valence 
ratings (i.e., more negative) for the upward and downward conditions relative to the 
baseline condition (p = .048 and p = .047, respectively). For positive memories there was 
also a main effect of Session, F(1, 24) = 13.42, p = .001, partial η2 = .36, qualified by a 
significant interaction with Condition, F(3, 22) = 3.25, p = .027, partial η2 = .119. To clarify 
this interaction we conducted pairwise comparisons between sessions for each condition. 
Valence ratings decreased (i.e., became more negative) from the first to the last session in 
the upward (p = .002), downward (p = .017), and baseline, (p < .001) conditions, but not in 
the remember condition (p = .385). 
Arousal. For negative memories, there were no effects. For positive memories, 
there was only a main effect of Session, F(1, 24) = 6.64, p = .017, partial η2 = .22, indicating 
that arousal ratings decreased from the first (M = 6.64, SEM = .16) to the last session (M = 
6.19, SEM = .17), although follow-up comparisons indicated that this effect was not 
significant for the remember condition (p = .377). 
Detail. For negative memories, there was a main effect of Session, F(1, 24) = 8.60, 
p = .007, partial η2 = .26, qualified by a significant interaction with Condition, F(3, 22) = 
3.90, p = .012, partial η2 = .14). To clarify this interaction, we conducted pairwise 
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comparisons between sessions for each condition. Detail ratings increased from the first to 
the last session only in the downward (p < .001) and the remember (p = .024) conditions. 
For positive memories, there were no effects. Finally, there were no effects or interactions 
for Ease or Relieving ratings.1 
 
Discussion 
Experiment 1 investigated the effects of retrieving a memory in the context of either 
an upward or a downward counterfactual simulation versus attentive reactivation in the 
absence of imaginative modification (i.e., remember), or no reactivation (i.e., baseline). 
The results revealed that negative memories became more positive from the first to the last 
session, regardless of condition. In contrast, positive memories became more negative from 
the first to the last session for all except the remember condition. Additionally, positive, 
but not negative, memories decreased in arousal from the first to the last session in all 
except the remember condition. The effect sizes, however, were either small or medium 
(Table 1). Interestingly, our results also showed that negative memories in the downward 
and remember conditions received higher ratings of detail in the last relative to the first 
session. This increase was not apparent in the upward CFT or the baseline conditions.  
The experimental paradigm employed in Experiment 1 included a surprise memory 
test in the third session, which allowed us to evaluate whether the previous effects 
depended upon correctly remembering initial AM. Although the results from the analysis 
                                                        
1 Although we did not have a prior hypothesis as to whether or not these results would depend upon correctly 
remembering having reactivated the memory in the context of a CFT, we decided to conduct a second 
analysis, following the same logic as the analysis above, but including only correctly remembered trials. 
However, the pattern of results was essentially the same. We include these analyses and results in 
Supplementary Information. 
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of correctly remembered trials did not significantly differ relative to the results from all 
trials (see Supplementary Information), including this recognition component in the last 
session introduced a potential confound in our experimental design. Given that the re-rating 
of AM in session 3 occurred only after participants were asked to recall them, in the context 
of the memory test, it is unclear whether the difference in the ratings found here is 
attributable to the retrieval manipulation in the session 2, memory reactivation during the 
last session, or both. To control for this potential confound, and to further elucidate the 
effects found in Experiment 1, we conducted a second experiment that did not include a 
memory component in session 3. Additionally, we included a stronger manipulation in 
session 2, whereby AM were reactivated three times—as opposed to only once as in 
Experiment 1—both in the CFT and the remember conditions. 
 
Experiment 2 
Methods 
Participants. 26 community members from the Durham, NC area participated in 
the study. Data from 1 participant were excluded due to computer error. As such, data from 
25 participants were analyzed (M age = 23.24, SD = 3.18; 13 women). Participants received 
monetary compensation for their collaboration, and gave consent following the 
requirements of the Institutional Review Board at Duke University. 
Procedure. The procedure was the same as Experiment 1 with three exceptions. 
First, during session 1, participants were asked to come up with 36 rather than 42 negative 
and positive AM and, thus, there were 8 rather than 10 AM assigned to each condition; the 
remaining ones, as in Experiment 1, were used for the practice trial. Second, in session 2, 
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participants simulated each memory, upward and downward episodic CFT three times—
as opposed to just one time—in random order. Participants were asked to simulate exactly 
the same CFT each time, rather than three different CFTs. Finally, as in Experiment 1, in 
session 3 participants were presented with the titles of all 64 memories generated in session 
1, but they did not receive a recognition test, that is, they were not asked to determine 
whether or not they had created a counterfactual alternative the previous day. Instead, they 
were simply asked to re-rate each memory on the same dimensions they had encountered 
in session 1. 
 
Results 
Average ratings for all trials are displayed in Table 2. Data from positive and 
negative memories were modeled independently as five separate 4 (Condition: Upward, 
Downward, Remember, Baseline) x 2 (Session: First, Last) ANOVAs for each rating.  
Valence. For negative memories, there were main effects of Condition, F(3, 22) = 
2.94, p = .039, η2 = .11, and Session, F(1, 24) = 14.142, partial η2 = .37, qualified by a 
Condition by Session interaction, F(3, 22) = 4.485, p = .012, partial η2 = .16. To clarify 
this interaction, we conducted pairwise comparisons between sessions for each condition. 
Valence ratings increased from the first to the last session only for the downward (p = .02,) 
and the remember (p < .001) conditions, but not for the upward or baseline conditions (all 
ps > .05). For positive memories, there was only an effect of Condition, F(3, 22) = 3.84, p 
= .013, partial η2 = .14, with no interaction. Post-hoc tests indicated that valence ratings 
were higher for the upward (M = 7.71, SEM = .115) relative to the remember (M = 7.49, 
SEM = .11) condition, but not the downward or baseline conditions (all ps > .05). 
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Arousal. For negative memories, there were no effects. For positive memories, 
there was only a main effect of Session, F(1, 24) = 14.49, p = .001, partial η2 = .38, 
indicating that arousal ratings decreased from the first (M = 5.95, SEM = .33) to the last (M 
= 5.34, SEM = .29) session.  
Detail. For negative memories, there was a main effect of Session, F(1, 24) = 10.74, 
p = 003, partial η2 = .31, qualified by a significant interaction with Condition, F(3, 22) = 
3.21, p = .028, partial η2 = .12. To clarify this interaction, we conducted pairwise 
comparisons between sessions for each condition. Detail ratings increased from the first to 
the last session only in the downward (p < .001) and the remember (p = .008) conditions. 
For positive memories, there was only a main effect of Condition, F(3, 22) = 4.02, p = 
.011, partial η2 = .14, with no interaction. Post-hoc tests indicated higher detail ratings in 
the upward (M = 6.77, SEM = .23) relative to the downward (M = 6.31, SEM = .21) and 
baseline (M = 6.33, SEM = .24) conditions (p = .047 and p = .032, respectively).  
Ease. For negative memories, there was a main effect of Condition, F(3, 22) = 8.57, 
p < .001, partial η2 = .26, qualified by significant interaction with Session, F(3, 22) = 4.73, 
p = .005, partial η2  = .17. To clarify this interaction, post-hoc comparisons were conducted. 
This analysis revealed that ratings of ease were higher in the upward relative to all other 
conditions in the first but not in the last session (largest p = .008). For positive memories, 
there was only a main effect of Condition, F(3, 22) = 4.66, p = .005, partial η2  = .16, with 
no interaction. Pairwise comparisons indicated that ratings of ease where only higher for 
upward (M = 6.80, SEM = .23) relative to the baseline (M = 6.29, SEM = .26) condition. 
Finally, there were no effects on reliving ratings. 
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Discussion 
Consistent with the findings from Experiment 1, in Experiment 2 we found an 
increase in positive valence for negative memories that were reactivated in the downward 
and remember conditions. However, this effect was not evident in the upward or baseline 
conditions, suggesting that these changes may have been due to either the reactivation of 
memories in the recognition test or the repetitive simulation during session 2. Additionally, 
in Experiment 2—unlike Experiment 1—the effect size in the remember condition was 
large, whereas the effect in the downward condition was small (Table 2). On the other 
hand, in contrast to Experiment 1, in Experiment 2 we found no effect of session on valence 
ratings for positive memories. The effects of arousal in Experiment 2 replicated those in 
Experiment 1, as reflected by a decrease in ratings from the first to the third session in 
positive, but not negative, memories. However, unlike Experiment 1, in Experiment 2 this 
effect was also significant for the remember condition. Finally, Experiment 2 also 
replicated the increase in detail ratings from the first to the last session in negative 
memories in the remember and downward conditions only.  
 
Common effects across Experiments 1 and 2 
Experiments 1 and 2 were designed to explore the role of reactivating AM in the 
context of upward or downward CFT relative to reactivating AM without counterfactual 
modification or not reactivating AM at all. Many of the findings from Experiment 1 were 
replicated in Experiment 2, despite minimal differences between the two. Thus, to better 
understand the impact of each reactivation condition on AM from the first to the last session 
and obtain a clearer idea of common effects of session across both experiments, we 
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conducted additional repeated measures 4 (Condition) x 2 (Session) ANOVAs for the 
ratings of valence, arousal, and detail on the combined effects across Experiments 1 and 2, 
with Experiment as between-subjects factor. 
Valence: For negative memories, there was no main effect of Experiment, F(1, 48) 
= 0.054, p = 0.82, partial η2 = 0.001. There were, however, main effects of Condition, F(3, 
47) = 7.84, p < .001, partial η2  = 0.138, and Session, F(1, 49) = 52.46, p < .001, partial η2  
= .517, qualified by a Session by Condition interaction, F(3, 47) = 2.88, p = 0.038, partial 
η2 = .06. To clarify this interaction, Bonferroni-corrected pairwise comparisons were 
conducted. This analysis revealed that while there was no difference between ratings of 
valence for negative memories during the first session, the ratings of valence during the 
second session were higher for the remember and baseline conditions relative to both CFT 
conditions (all ps < .005; Figure 1A). This finding suggests that while in all conditions the 
ratings of valence for negative AM increased (i.e., became more positive) from the first to 
the third session, the increment was greater for the remember and baseline conditions 
relative to both upward and downward CFT conditions.    
For positive memories, there was no main effect of Experiment, F(1, 48) = 0.176, 
p = 0.68, partial η2   = 0.004. There were, however, main effects of Condition, F(3, 47) = 
3.68, p = 0.014, partial η2 = 0.7, and Session, F(1, 49) = 12.53, p < .001, partial η2 = 0.204, 
qualified by a Condition by Session interaction, F(3, 47) = 5.64, p = 0.001, partial η2 = 
0.103. To clarify this interaction, Bonferroni-corrected pairwise comparisons were 
conducted. This analysis confirmed that while ratings of valence for positive AM decreased 
(i.e., became less positive) from the first to the last session in the upward, downward and 
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baseline conditions (largest p = 0.006), they remained unchanged in the remember 
condition (p = 0.708; Figure 1B).  
Arousal: For negative memories, there was no main effect of Experiment, F(1, 48) 
= 2.90, p = 0.095, partial η2 = 0.057, and only a main effect of condition, F(3, 47) = 4.779, 
p = 0.003, partial η2 = 0.091. Bonferroni-corrected pairwise comparisons revealed that 
arousal ratings in the upward CFT were higher than in the baseline condition (p = 0.002).  
Within-subject effects were not modeled jointly for positive memories because there was 
a main effect of Experiment, F(1, 48) = 5.48, p = 0.023, partial η2  = 0.103. 
Detail: For negative memories, there was no effect of Experiment, F(1, 48) = 3.51, 
p = 0.067, partial η2  = 0.068. There were, however, main effects of Condition, F(3, 47) = 
3.389, p = 0.020, partial η2 = 0.066, and Session, F(1, 49) = 18.952, p < .001, partial η2 = 
0.283, qualified by a Condition by Session interaction, F(3, 47) = 7.086, p < .001, partial 
η2 = 0.129. Follow-up Bonferroni-corrected pairwise comparisons indicated that ratings of 
detail in the upward CFT were greater than the baseline condition, (p = 0.029. Additionally, 
this analysis revealed an increase in ratings of detail from the first to the third session for 
the downward (p < .001), and remember, (p < .001), but not for the upward or baseline 
conditions (both ps > .05; Figure 1C). There were no effects for positive memories.2 
 
General Discussion 
The current study compared how engaging in upward and downward episodic CFT 
for positive and negative AM modified phenomenological ratings of valence, arousal, 
                                                        
2  For completeness, we are including the analyses of Ease and Reliving across both Experiments in 
Supplementary Information. 
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detail, ease and reliving relative to attentively reactivating AM in non-imaginative 
contexts, or not reactivating them at all. Five general hypotheses were explored. First, 
based upon previous evidence showing similarities between CFT and perspective-shift in 
AM (St Jacques, Carpenter, Szpunar and Schacter, 2018) as well as reactivation-related 
effects of perspective-shifts in AM (e.g., Sekiguchi and Nonaka, 2014; Butler et al., 2016; 
St Jacques et al., 2017), we expected changes from the first to the last session for ratings 
of valence, arousal and detail in AM reactivated in the CFT conditions relative to those 
reactivated in the attentive remembering and baseline conditions. Second, based upon 
previous results showing increases in ease and reliving as a function of repetition for both 
CFT and AM (De Brigard et al., 2013; Stanley et al., 2017), we expected ease and reliving 
to equally increase after reactivation for the attentive remembering and CFT conditions 
relative to baseline. Third, we hypothesized that the direction of this effect would differ 
between negative and positive memories depending on whether the original memory is 
reactivated in the context of an upward or a downward CFT. Fourth, based upon previous 
research on attentive retrieval and emotional reappraisal (Ochsner and Gross, 2005; Todd 
et al., 2012), we anticipated lasting down-regulation of both negative and positive AM in 
the attentive remembering condition without counterfactual modification relative to the 
condition with no reactivation. Finally, we expected minimal to no changes between the 
first and third sessions in the AM that were not reactivated in session 2.  
Experiments 1 and 2 yielded four general findings. First, in Experiment 1, negative 
AM were rated as less negative during the last relative to the first session regardless of 
condition, with effect sizes larger for the remember and baseline relative to the CFT 
conditions. In Experiment 2, this reduction in negativity was significant only for the 
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downward and remember conditions, with the latter showing the same large effect as in 
Experiment 1. When the results of Experiments 1 and 2 are analyzed together, it is clear 
that this reduction in negative valence for negative memories was greater for the remember 
and baseline conditions relative to both CFT conditions—although the effect size in the 
remember condition was much larger than in the baseline condition. Second, positive AM 
were rated as less positive in the last relative to the first session in all but the attentive 
remembering condition. This pattern of results was evident in Experiment 1 and also when 
results from Experiment 1 and 2 were analyzed together; however, it failed to reach 
significance in Experiment 2, suggesting that perhaps the absence of the memory test at 
the end of Experiment 2 reduced the size of the effect. Third, Experiments 1 and 2 showed 
a reduction of arousal ratings for positive—but not negative—AM from the first to the last 
session in the baseline and both CFT conditions; however, only in Experiment 2 was this 
effect evident for the remember condition. Finally, both Experiments 1 and 2—individually 
and analyzed together—showed that negative AM reactivated either in a downward CFT 
or in the attentive remembering conditions were rated as more detailed in the last relative 
to the first session. The impact of each finding for our hypotheses is discussed in turn. 
First, although both studies revealed a reduction in negative valence for negative 
AM across all conditions, the reduction was larger for the conditions in which there was 
no CFT modification—that is, the remember and baseline conditions—and the effect size 
was much larger for the remember than the baseline condition. We interpret this finding in 
the context of recent research on attentive-bias and emotional up-regulation (Ochsner and 
Gross, 2005; Todd et al., 2012). According to this view, attentively focusing on particular 
details of emotional stimuli tends to modulate the affect associated with them. In the case 
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of negative stimuli, attending to negative details of the stimulus tends to up-regulate (i.e., 
lessen the negativity of) the emotion with which it is appraised. Thus, actively focusing on 
specific details of negative memories—as participants were asked to do in the remember 
condition—may bias their attention toward salient aspects of their negative experiences, 
which in turn instigates emotional up-regulation. Indeed, it seems that a single reactivation 
of a negative AM a week later—as in the baseline condition—may suffice to bring about 
the effect, albeit the difference in effect sizes indicates that the attentive reactivation of AM 
during the second session was more effective. Therefore, this finding suggests that 
attentively reactivating a memory in a non-imaginative context may be a more successful 
emotional reappraisal strategy to up-regulate negative AM than reactivating them in a CFT 
context.  
By contrast, we found a reduction in positive valence for positive AM from the first 
to the last session across all conditions except the remember condition. This result is 
consistent with numerous studies on fading affect bias, according to which emotional 
information associated with positive memories tends to fade slower than emotional 
information associated with negative memories (Walker, Skowronski, and Thompson, 
2003; Walter and Skowronski, 2009). Additionally, in the current study the lack of decline 
in valence for positive AM from the first to the last session in the remember condition 
suggests that the act of attentively reactivating positive AM slows the rate of fading affect. 
Moreover, our results also suggest that not reactivating a memory, or reactivating it within 
the context of generating a counterfactual simulation, may increase the rate with which the 
associated affect fades. Taken together, the results of valence ratings for both negative and 
positive AM suggest a clear picture: attentive remembering is the best strategy to both 
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reduce the negative affect associated with negative AM, and to prevent the decay of 
positive affect associated with positive AM.  
Our third finding indicates that reactivation of AM affects arousal ratings 
differently than it does valence ratings. For one, we found no reduction of arousal for 
negative AM. By contrast, we found a reduction in arousal ratings from the first to the last 
session for positive AM regardless of condition in Experiment 2, suggesting that whether 
or not a positive memory is reactivated, and whether or not it is mentally modified in a 
counterfactual context, positive AM tend to become less arousing over time. However, it 
is important to note that this effect was not evident for the remember condition in 
Experiment 1, suggesting that either the repetitive reactivation or the elimination of the 
surprise memory test in session 3 may have boosted the reduction of arousal ratings in the 
last relative to the first session. Further studies would be needed to fully clarify why 
feelings of arousal associated with positive AM are influenced by reactivation.    
The final result yielded by our studies—an increase in detail ratings from the first 
to the last session for negative AM reactivated either in a downward CFT or in the 
remember conditions—supports our hypothesis that increasing attention to negative AM-
based simulations modulates the perceived detail with which such simulation is 
experienced at a later time. Moreover, the effect sizes were equivalent between these two 
conditions, and across both experiments, which further suggests that imagining how a 
negative event could have been worse can increase the level of detail with which an 
episodic memory is experienced to the same degree as focusing on a specific detail of such 
memory without mentally modifying it. The idea that negative valence is correlated with 
increased attention to detail has been consistently reported in the literature (Schwarz, 1990; 
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Wegner and Vallacher, 1986). In turn, these attentional effects have been shown to have 
downstream consequences during remembering, as negative affect at retrieval has been 
associated with enhanced vividness and more detailed AM (Mickley and Kensinger, 2009). 
If so, then, the negative affect associated with reflecting upon a worse alternative to a bad 
event, or with attentively focusing on a detail of negative AM, is likely to increase the 
perceived detail with which such a mental simulation is experienced later on. 
Taken together, our findings lend mixed support to some of our initial hypotheses. 
We found partial support for our first hypothesis, according to which there would be 
differential effects for valence, arousal and detail of AM reactivated in the context of CFT 
relative to attentive remembering and baseline. Our findings suggest differential effects of 
valence and detail, but not arousal. More precisely—and related to our third hypothesis—
we found clear differences in the rate of change from the first to the last session in valence 
ratings for negative AM, with higher change for those reactivated in the Remember 
condition. Conversely, we found no difference in effect of session for valence ratings of 
positive AM when these were reactivated in either the CFT or the baseline condition. 
Likewise, ratings of detail increased for negative AM reactivated in the remember or the 
downward CFT, but there was no increase for the baseline and upward CFT conditions, or 
for positive AM.  
Our results yielded no support for our second hypothesis—that ease and reliving 
would increase similarly in the CFT and remember conditions relative to the baseline 
condition. It is possible that this hypothesis was not supported in the current study because 
the AM provided by the participants had already been sufficiently rehearsed such that the 
experimental manipulation of reactivation in the lab did not affect base-rates of ease and 
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reliving. Nevertheless, our results lend strong support to our fourth hypothesis, according 
to which attentive retrieval of emotional information modulates affective information for 
both negative and positive AM. As discussed, our findings suggest that this attentive-bias 
influences valence ratings differentially for negative and positive memories, and also when 
contrasted with AM reactivation in a CFT context. Finally, our fifth hypothesis—whereby 
we predicted no changes due to time in ratings made for AM in the baseline condition—
was only supported for detail, ease and reliving. We did find changes in ratings of valence 
for negative AM and valence and arousal for positive AM in the baseline condition that, 
again, may be related to an expected fading affect bias.  
It is important to mention two limitations of the current experimental design. First, 
despite having been randomly selected, we often found differences in ratings between 
conditions for both positive and negative AM. Given how difficult it is to generate usable 
emotional AM, equating them across all conditions for all ratings is challenging. Perhaps 
further studies looking at more specific subsets of emotional AM may be able to control 
for baseline differences to help to clarify the effects uncovered by our current studies. 
Second, and relatedly, an experimental design whereby AM are fully counterbalanced 
across participants may eliminate possible concerns derived from the randomization 
strategy employed here, where possible carry-over effects from one trial to the next may 
have influenced our results—although the fact that many of our results were consistent 
across Experiments 1 and 2 assuages that concern.   
 
Conclusion and future directions 
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When remembering AM, people often mentally modify the retrieved contents in 
different ways. One way is to think about alternative ways past personal events could have 
occurred, an autobiographically based mental simulation known as episodic CFT. The 
current study reports the results of two experiments comparing how engaging in upward or 
downward episodic CFT about positive and negative AM altered their phenomenological 
content relative to attentively reactivating AM with no CFT modification. It was found that 
negative AM that were reactivated in a CFT condition decreased their negative valence in 
the last relative to the first session less so than negative AM that were merely attentively 
remembered or not reactivated at all. Conversely, positive AM decreased their positive 
valence from the first to the last session in all conditions except during attentive 
remembering, where no change was registered. These results suggest that attentive 
remembering is the best strategy to reduce the negative affect associated with negative AM, 
and to preserve the positive affect associated with positive AM. Additionally, positive AM 
were experienced as less arousing during the last relative to the first session across all 
conditions. Finally, we also found that negative AM that were reactivated in either a 
downward CFT or merely attentively remembered were perceived with more detail during 
the last relative to the first session.  
The current results contribute to a related line of research exploring 
phenomenological effects of shifting visual perspective during the retrieval of AM 
(Robinson and Swanson, 1993; Berntsen and Rubin, 2006; Vella and Moulds, 2014; Butler 
et al, 2016). For instance, Sekiguchi and Nonaka (2014) found that mentally shifting 
perspective from first- to third-person perspective during the second session reduced the 
reported emotional intensity a month later, relative to a condition in which no perspectival 
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change was involved. More recently, St. Jacques, Szpunar and Schacter (2017) found that 
shifting visual perspective during retrieval of AM reduced ratings of emotional intensity 
relative to maintaining the same perspective. Taken together, these results suggest that 
mentally modifying certain aspects of AM at retrieval, such as visual perspective, reshapes 
the phenomenological experience with which AM are retrieved online and subsequently 
remembered. Given recent results indicating strong commonalities between neural 
structures engaged during episodic CFT and perspective shift in AM (St Jacques, 
Carpenter, Szpunar, & Schacter, 2017), a fruitful avenue for future research would be to 
compare long-term changes in AM as a result of either engaging in episodic CFT or shifting 
perspective.     
Finally, and perhaps more importantly, our results contribute to the growing 
literature on the long-lasting effects of mental modifications on AM (Sekiguchi and 
Nonaka, 2014; Butler et al, 2016; St Jacques, Szpunar and Schacter, 2017). Moreover, we 
also hope they help to evaluate the effectiveness of employing episodic CFT during 
memory reactivation as an emotion regulation strategy to mollify positive and negative 
aspects of AM, both in experimental as well as clinical settings (De Brigard and Hanna, 
2015). For instance, our results clearly indicate that reactivating negative AM in 
counterfactual contexts, such as regret-producing upward CFT, does not decrease the 
negative affect associated with the memory experience, whereas simply reactivating the 
memory without imaginative modifications does. Given our unfortunate tendency to 
generate regret producing upward CFT when remembering negative AM (Summerville and 
Roese, 2008), it may be advisable then to re-orient one’s attention toward details of the 
actual event while avoiding mental modifications. For therapeutic purposes it may be best 
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to prevent regret inducing CFT to get in the way of memory’s natural tendency to up-
regulate negative emotions during attentive AM reactivation. Somewhat paradoxically, the 
best strategy to let the negative emotion fade may be to remember it.  
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